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LEGAL METHODS FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF ORGANIZED CRIME
(A SYMPOSIUM)
Organized crime is a vital problem in the
field of law enforcement. Because of the nature
of its various forms of activity, the suppression
of organized crime presents difficulties not
ordinarily encountered in other areas of criminal
conduct. In this and subsequent issues of the
Journal, a series of articles will examine these
problems and the legal remedies available for
their solution.
The existence of organized crime in any com-
munity requires the co-operation of the local
police or prosecutor. The legal methods for the
prosecution or removal from office of such cor-
rupt officials will be discussed in the first paper
of the present symposium: "Legal Remedies
Against Corrupt Law Enforcement Officers".
Where the primary law enforcement officials
fail to perform their duties, effective methods of
enforcement must be found. This problem will
be analyzed in the second and third papers:
"The Investigative Function of the Prosecuting
Attorney"; and "Circumventing the Corrupt
Prosecutor: Supercession by the State Attorney
General and the Appointment of a Special
Prosecutor."
Apart from the problem of official corruption,
the usual forms of criminal prosecution often
have been found ineffective in permanently
eliminating organized gambling and vice.
Alternative devices must therefore be employed.
The fourth of the symposium paper, entitled
"The Use of Equitable Devices to Suppress
Organized Crime", will consider the mechanics
and availability of the use of the injunction and
other equitable remedies where the usual legal
remedies have proved inadequate. The fifth and
concluding paper, "Indirect Control of Organized
Crime Through Liquor License Revocation", will
examine this tactic as a substitute for direct
criminal prosecution.
Warren L. Swanson*
Legal Remedies Against Corrupt Law
Enforcement Officers
ARTHUR BULLER
The chief source of revenue for organized
crime is gambling.' This form of vice requires
public patronage; for this reason, the police
generally are aware of the existence of such
illegal activity.2 The public will not patronize
gambling houses unless there is some assurance
of freedom from interference by the police.
* Editor-in-Chief, Criminal Law Case Notes and
Comments, 1956-57. Now Teaching Associate,
Northwestern University School of Law. The
papers published as part of this symposium were
prepared under Mr. Swanson's direction.
'Senate Special Committee to Investigate Or-
ganized Crime in Interstate Commerce, Third
Interim Report, S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1951).
2 Id, at 184.
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Consequently criminal elements have centered
their activities mainly in those areas in which
they have achieved, or are able to achieve,
official immunity from legal process. The basic
problem thus presented is how to sever this
corrupt connection betweep law enforcement
officers and organized crime.
The corrupt official, from the public prose-
cutor to the policeman on the beat, is subject to
penal sanctions for misconduct in office, a
criminal offense, and to a civil removal action
where he has failed to perform the obligations
of his office. The fundamental obligations of law
enforcement officials have been divided into
two classifications: discretionary duties and
ministerial duties, with different standards for
each. A determination of the remedies available
against a particular official, including the prose-
cutor himself, requires a consideration of the
character of his functions, i.e., whether they are
discretionary or ministerial.
NATURLE OF = PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
Since the foremost obligation of the prose-
cutor is to enforce the law through prosecution
of its violators, if the criminal elements can
control his office, they are in a position to
frustrate such enforcement. 3 Under the various
state statutes, the prosecutor theoretically
should use the machinery of his office whenever
he has reason to believe that crimes have been
committed by particular individuals.4 As a
practical matter, however, his obligation to
initiate prosecution is discretionary. 5 In other
words, the prosecutor, in the exercise of his
general duty of prosecuting violators of the law,
has a very broad, vaguely limited discretion to
pursue that course of action which seems right
to him under the circumstances. His discretion
apparently is not subject to review so long as it
is founded upon a good faith effort to enforce
3See Ploscowe, ORGANIZED CRIME A.-ND LAW
ENFORcEMENT, 217 (1952).
4 Id, at 218.
5 See People v. Pollach, 25 Cal. App. 440, 77
P.2d 885 (1938); United States v. Thompson, 251
U.S. 407 (1920); United States v. Brokaw, 60 F.
Supp. 100 (S.D. Ill. 1945); District of Columbia v.
Buckley, 128 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
the laws.6 The actual application of this discre-
tion to a particular case is controlled neither by
law nor by the courts;7 the prosecutor selects
the person and the time to prosecute.8
6 An example of the difficulty encountered by the
courts in trying to pin down the legal meaning of
the word "discretion" is found in State v. Wallach,
353 Mo. 312, 182 S.W.2d 313 (1944). The court
there ascribed to the prosecutor the discretion to
"act officially in such circumstances, upon each
separate case, according to the dictates of his own
judgment and conscience uncontrolled by the
judgment and conscience of any other person, such
discretion to be used in accordance with established
principles of law... 2' Query, if the prosecutor
must act in accordance with "established prin-
ciples of law," is it really true that he can act upon
each case guided by his own judgment and con-
science and without outside influence?
The Wallach case highlighted another difficulty
in this matter of discretion. The court said that the
prosecutor may in good faith (but not arbitrarily)
exercise his discretion with respect to when, how and
against whom to initiate criminal proceedings.
When is performance, or the lack of it, in good
faith; or the converse, when does it indicate bad
faith, or arbitrariness?
Where a prosecutor was shown to have failed
completely in commencing any prosecution for
violation of gambling laws, even after having full
information about the conditions, it was held that
he had been guilty of bad faith and arbitrariness in
the use of his discretion. The court found that "He
had made no effort whatsoever to perform his
duties as prosecuting attorney" and that he "never
reached the point of even pretending to exercise
discretion." McKittrick v. Wymore, 345 Mo. 169,
132 S.W.2d 979, 986 (1939). In McKittrick v.
Graves, 346 Mo. 990, 144 S.W.2d 91 (1940), it was
held that the prosecutor-defendant wilfully and un-
lawfully failed to properly enforce liquor control
laws, where there was continuous long existing
conditions of flagrant and notorious gambling,
prostitution, and illegal sale of intoxicating liquor,
frequently commented upon by the press. The
prosecutor had made no attempt to prosecute,
claiming that, since the police did not attempt any
enforcement, he was excused from doing so.
7See, e.g., Leone v. Fanelli, 87 N.Y.S.2d 850
(1949). In the Fandli case, an attempt was made to
compel the local district prosecutor to "forthwith
and diligently prosecute the indictment against one
Frank Smith ...... The court pointed out that it was
19571
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In formulating his decision whether or not to
prosecute, the prosecutor may be influenced by
one or more of the following considerations:
Will prosecution be a waste of time? Will it be
unduly expensive to the state? What are the
chances of obtaining conviction? Are there
extenuating circumstances? Will there be un-
favorable political reverberations, both as to
himself and his party or associates? Was the law
that was violated an "undesirable" one? If the
offender is a friend, the prosecutor may feel an
indictment a poor way to repay friendship.9
Though not all of these considerations are
proper elements of discretion, they are of such a
personal nature as motivating factors that their
presence in the mind of the prosecutor, without
more, will not serve as a basis for judicial
sanction against the prosecutor. Such consider-
ations are practical elements of his discretion.
In addition to his ability to refuse to initiate
prosecution, the corrupt prosecutor can in many
instances effectively forfeit a conviction by
underplaying his role in criminal investiga-
tions. 10 Generally, by the time a case has
progressed to the point where it is ready for
trial, most of the evidence has been collected.
Any additional necessary investigations are
usually of a supplementary nature, and the
prosecutor must conduct these in order to have
the duty of the prosecutor to prosecute crimes
within the county for which he was elected, and
that such duty entailed the exercise of discretion
and the pursuit of some fixed enforcement policy
which the court may not supervise. The court ruled
that the general duty to prosecute all crimes or the
special duty to prosecute a particular crime may
not be required or supervised.
Apparently the prosecutor's discretion is not
limited to cases where indictments are in existence
against particular defendants, but extends to the
earlier stage of the game where complaints are
made that crimes have been committed and the
prosecutor is requested to use the powers of his
office to obtain indictments and prosecute offenders.
8 Ploscowe, ORGAnxzED Cu=, 219 (1952).
9See Baker, The Prosecutor-Initiation of
Prosecution, 23 J. Cum. L. & CRmMnoLoGY,
770-71 (1933).
10 See the second one of the present series of
articles, on prosecutor's investigative powers.
the strongest possible case. A problem is pre-
sented, however, where the prosecutor has
merely a complaint that a crime has been com-
mitted, or that some individual or group is
carrying on a particular form of criminal ac-
tivity. The question thereby presented resolves
itself into two alternatives: 1) Is the prosecuting
attorney only a lawyer for the state who pre-
sents to a court or grand jury the evidence ob-
tained by others concerning the crime and the
alleged guilty?; or 2) Does he have the broader
duty of independently gathering the evidence?"
Unfortunately, most state statutes fail to assign
to the prosecutor any precise duties in the insti-
tution of criminal investigations. 2 The haziness
in respect to the investigative powers, their
extent and use, has been partially responsible
for the failure of criminal indictments against
inefficient or corrupt prosecuting attorneys. The
corrupt prosecutor, when challenged to justify
his laxity in the investigation of complaints,
usually will defend his actions on the hypothesis
that he lacks any positive investigative duty 3
A prosecutor linked with organized crime has
n Ploscowe, ORGAxZED Cnra, 247 (1952).
2 Id, at 249. See also note 10 supra.
13Even where statute assigns the prosecutor the
general duty to investigate in preparation to
bringing an indictment against an offender, it must
be taken into consideration that judicial interpreta-
tion of the statutory provision may nullify in part or
in whole the legislative purpose. In State v. Wallach,
353 Mo. 312, 182 S.W.2d 313 (1944), for example,
the prosecutor was charged with the statutory
duty to investigate, i.e., to inquire into the matter
with care and accuracy, examine available evidence
in each case, the law and the facts and the appli-
cability of each to the other, and intelligently
weigh chances of successful termination of prosecu-
tion, having in mind the relative importance to the
county he served of different prosecutions he might
initiate. The court held that the legislature really
did not intend to saddle the prosecutor with the
personal obligation of undertaking investigations,
but intended instead merely to hold him responsible
along with other law enforcement officials for hav-
ing the work done by somebody. Such a judicial
outlook, combined with the inherently discretionary
nature of the prosecutor's functions, increases the
difficulty in successfully prosecuting the official
for failing to initiate investigation of complaints.
(Vol. 48
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a potent weapon with which to defeat justice in
the "bargain and compromise."'14 By this dis-
cretionary procedure, a prosecutor may col-
laborate with the defense attorney and arrange
for a plea of guilty, sometimes to the offense
charged, but very frequently to a lesser offense.
There are numerous instances in which the
device serves a valid purpose;'5 however, the
peculiar adaptability of this strategem to
criminal abuse should subject it to close
scrutiny. Through an intermediary usually
referred to as a "fixer," a defendant may make
a proposal to the prosecutor advising that he
will agree to plead guilty to a lesser offense than
the one charged. There have been frequent
occasions when the plea thus accepted, and the
punishment which was imposed, were trivial in
comparison to the severity of the crime com-
mitted.16
14 Bargain and compromise are the usual result of
law violations. Justice usually is futile in trials. The
smart defendants usually get the best possible deal
with the prosecution and then pay off. Our pro-
cedure has its faults. Juries often err and the human
element in verdicts make any jury case a matter of
uncertainty. One of the twelve may hold out and
defeat justice. Moreover, the prosecutor must face
as well the possibility of uncertain sentences if he
goes to trial. If he were offered the acceptance of a
four-year term by the defense, goes to trial and only
wins a three-year term, the state suffers a double
loss. The farther a case goes, the more uncertain it
becomes. Contrary to the usual view, the prosecutor
who is a shrewd bargainer adds to the certainty of
the law. The good prosecutor tries his strong cases
but he always bargains with his weak ones.
Baker, The Prosecutor, 23 J. Clum. L. & CRzm-
NOLOGY, 787 (1933).
15 The prosecutor may have perfectly legitimate
reasons for striking a bargain with the defendant's
attorney. His case may be weak. Corroborating
testimony may be missing. The complainant may
be himself an unsympathetic character and may
have contributed to the crime. The penalties of the
law may be too harsh for the specific crime with
which the defendant is charged. Jury trial is
notoriously uncertain, expensive and time-con-
suming. The defendant may have aided the prose-
cutor in another proceeding, and thus deserved some
mitigation in treatment.
Ploscowe, ORGAN=ZD CRImE, 222 (1952).
36 When the plea of guilty is found in records it is
The decision to take a plea of guilty in a par-
ticular case lies, as a practical matter, within the
discretion of the prosecutor, whether his
motives be good or bad. Theoretically, courts
can refuse to accept the pleas which are offered.
The courts, however, are heavily dependent for
information upon the prosecutor and are in-
effective in supervising the taking of pleas. 17
Furthermore, the judge cannot order prosecu-
tion of the greater offense. 8 Consequently, as a
general rule, the plea offered by the prosecutor
is accepted by the court.
Armed with the power to employ the "bargain
and compromise,'" the dishonest prosecutor can
thus attain for himself a measure of respect in
the community by securing an impressive
number of convictions, and at the same time
serve the cause of organized crime by the anemic
nature of the punishments meted out. If, for
instance, grand larceny has been committed,
the corrupt prosecutor may agree to accept a
plea of guilty to the offense of petit larceny;
hence, the prosecutor will have a conviction
added to his record and the offender will have
received an illegal favor. To ameliorate the evils
of the prosecutor's practically unrestrained dis-
cretion in using the "bargain and compromise,"
it has been suggested that a full hearing should
be held on every request that a "plea to the
lesser offense" be entered; and that some
method should be devised to indicate to the
court that a conviction cannot be expected on
almost certain to have in the background, particu-
larly in Cook County, a session of bargaining with
the state's attorney. If the prisoner is charged with
a severe crime, which for some reason or other he
does not care to fight, he frequently makes over-
tures to the state's attorney to the effect that he
will plead guilty to a lesser crime than the one
charged.... These approaches, particularly in
Cook County, are often made through another
person called a "fixer" .... We found many cases in
which the plea accepted, and the punishment in-
flicted, seemed trivial in comparison to the magni-
tude of the crime committed.
Illinois Crime Survey, 470 (1929).
17 Ploscowe, ORGANIzED CRIhE, 223 (1952).
18 Baker, The Prosecutor, 23 J. CRIM. L. &
CRI MaNoLoGY, 788 (1933).
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the greater charge before it is permitted to be
abandoned. 19
In addition to his authority to compromise,
the criminally-influenced prosecutor can
"throw" many cases by use of the common law
motion nolle prosequi, or similar motion to dis-
miss the indictment.20 This motion gives the
prosecutor effective control over the progress of
criminal proceedings. It is within his discretion
to dismiss an indictment or refuse to prosecute.
It has been held that a court is powerless to
prevent the entry of the order nolle prosequi,
and that it may be entered without leave of
court.n In federal practice, if an order dismissing
the indictment is properly made, the court, in
the absence of special statutory authority, has
no power to refuse it, unless it can be shown
that the refusal to prosecute results from cor-
rupt motives. s
19 See id, at 791.
2 United States v. Woody, 2 F.2d 262 (D.
Mont. 1924).
21 The court commented that the motion itself is
but a form to advise the court that the prosecutor
will not prosecute the accused, and to clear the
court's records of an abandoned case. Id, at 264.
22 United States v. Brokaw, 60 F. Supp. 100
(S.D. Ill. 1945). In this case, the federal govern-
ment charged that an order be directed to the
district attorney to show cause why an order nolle
prosequi should not be vacated and the cause re-
instated and set for trial. The court held against the
government. It said that the control of criminal
litigation is a prerogative and power similar to the
power to initiating a prosecution and with reference
to such control the prosecutor derives his power and
duty from the common law, and thus under the
common law he may not be required to submit his
authority with respect to controlling the litigation in
its various stages to the control of judicial dis-
cretion or the desires of interested individuals.
At common law, prior to trial the prosecutor had
the absolute uncontrolled power to enter nolle
prosequi, and after the empaneling of the jury until
the return of the verdict, the power was subject to
control of the court, and following the return of the
verdict the uncontrolled power of the prosecutor
to enter a nolle prosqeui revives and continues until
such time as judgment is entered and sentence
imposed.
The court noted that whenever an order of nolle
prosequi is properly entered, it remains the act of
It has been suggested that the motion nolle
prosequi gives the prosecutor a power that is
especially vulnerable to abuse in large cities,
because of a mounting crime rate, lack of a
tradition of disinterested public service, and the
unhealthful ramifications of political in-
fluence.Y Several states have sought to remedy
this unrestrained power by providing that the
prosecutor must obtain court approval for a
motion to dismiss an indictment or informa-
tion.24 The unethical use of this common law
power of the prosecutor to dismiss indictments
may perhaps be circumscribed by a require-
ment that the court approve a nolle prosequi
only for "good cause" which decision should be
entered in the minutes "with reasons there-
for."2 1 Due to the dependency of the court
upon the prosecutor for information, and fre-
quently congested dockets, however, such dis-
positions by the prosecutor usually are final,
the prosecuting officer terminating the criminal
proceeding, and the court, unless authorized by
statute, has no power to enter such an order or
direct that such order be entered. The Brokaw
case held that prosecution or dismissal of all
criminal actions in federal courts rests in the
honest discretion of the prosecutor, and if from a
corrupt motive he prosecutes, or refuses to prose-
cute, the only remedy is a proceeding to remove him
from office or a criminal prosecution.
2 The motion nolle prosequi is another example
of the decay of an institution which flourished
successfully under the rural conditions of its origin,
but which threatens to become a menace in a great
modem city. Where the few criminal cases furnish
diversion for the town, where the prosecutor is a
marked man among his fellow-citizens, where in-
terest in the crime and the criminals lightens the
harvest and shortens the winter evenings, there can
be little abuse of the motion. Such checks are lost,
however, in the rush and roar of a great city, es-
pecially the typical American metropolis, with its
mounting crime rate, its lack of a tradition of dis-
interested public service and the insidious rami-
fications of political influence.
Cleveland Crime Survey, 328 (1922).
24 See Wickersham Commission Report on Prose-
cution, 98 (1931).
25 Baker, The Prosecutor, 23 J. Cim. L. &
CRMNOLOGY, 791 (1933).
[Vol. 48
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with or without the approval or direction of the
court.
NATURE OF THE POLICE OFFICE
In contrast to the discretionary nature of the
duties of the prosecutor, the duties of the police
department are essentially ministerial. The
police officer's duty is to execute the mandates
lawfully issued by his superiors.2 His obligation
to perform is mandatory rather than permis-
siveY The performance of his duties is not sub-
ject to the factor of personal judgment which
characterizes the office of the prosecutor.n
It is conceivable, however, for a ministerial
officer to possess a quantum of discretionary
power to look into facts and act upon them
without altering the ministerial nature of his
office.u For example, it has been held that a
26 Knickerbocker v. Redlands High School
Dist., 49 Cal. App.2d 722, 122 P.2d 289 (1942);
Mekota v. State Bd. of Equalization and Assess-
ment, 146 Neb. 370, 19 N.W.2d 633 (1945).
"Antin v. Union High School Dist., 130 Ore.
461, 280 Pac. 664 (1929).
28 Cf, Hall v. State, 136 Fla. 644, 187 So. 392
(1939); Commonwealth v. Brownmiller, 141 Pa.
Super, 107, 14 A.2d 907 (1940); Proctor v. Hufnail,
111 Vt. 365, 16 A.2d 518 (1940).
29 A duty is nonetheless ministerial because the
person required to perform it is permitted a choice
of methods or instrumentalities in its discharge.
State v. Howard, 83 Vt. 6, 74 Atl.392 (1909).
If ministerial officers can perform nothing but
ministerial acts, then it is hard to conceive of such
officer, for some of the acts of every ministerial
officer must require the exercise of judgment and
discretion, which is the very antithesis of a min-
isterial act. The ministerial officer may, therefor,
very properly be invested with power and authority
of a quasi-official character without at all affecting
the general classification into which all civil officers
are divided.
State v. Ellis, 163 Neb. 86, 77 N.W.2d 809 813,
(1956).
Generally, the character of a duty as ministerial
or discretionary must be determined by the act to be
performed, and not by the office of the performer.
Official duty is ministerial when it is absolute,
certain and imperative, involving merely execution
of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated
facts; that a necessity may exist for the ascertain-
ment of those facts does not operate to convert the
police superintendent, charged with ministerial
obligations in causing the laws of the state to be
executed and enforced, is at the same time in-
vested with discretion in the allocation of avail-
able resources in the performance of those
duties.30 Where the superintendent is faced
with a serious gambling problem, for example,
and also other crimes demanding attention, he
must take into account the number of men at
his disposal, and the relative severity of the
various crimes, in deciding what action to take
in the performance of his ministerial duties.3'
This discretion in the allocation of men and
other resources is a significant factor to be con-
sidered in an action against such a police official
for misconduct in office.
REMEDIES-IISCO'NDUCT IN OFFICE
There are two forms of judicial sanction
against law enforcement officials-civil and
criminal. Included in the former are personal re-
act into one discretionary in its nature. Stephens v.
Jones, 24 S.D. 97, 123 N.W. 705 (1909). 43 Am.
JuR., Public Officers, § 238 (1942).
3sHe may suspect that a person is violating the
laws against gambling and yet it may be wise to
postpone a raid or an arrest until more evidence is
secured, or until other persons concerned may be
apprehended. He must work largely through
subordinates and it may well be that all police
matters cannot be given immediate attention. He
may have to decide whether to use his men at a
certain time for the suppression of gambling, or for
the solution of a murder. ... If he used his men for
other purposes at a certain time, even though he
acted in perfect good faith, it would be true that, as
the indictment charges, he "did wilfully omit,
neglect and refuse to cause the laws of the Com-
monwealth prohibiting the maintenance ... of
gambling houses.., to be executed and enforced."
Had he used his men in a concerted drive against
gambling, he might with equal justice be charged
with failing to enforce the law against murder, or
some other crime. Obviously this is a case where
there can be no crime unless the motive be bad, and
all counts of the indictment are insufficient because
there is no charge of fraud, dishonesty or corruption.
Commonwealth v. Hubbs, 137 Pa. Super. 244,
8 A.2d 618, 621 (1939).
311d, at 621.
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moval actions,n quo warranto proceedings,3
and proceedings to remove the prosecutor's
name from the rolls of the court.m The criminal
action involves indictment for misconduct in
office. Removal actions are based upon statu-
tory cause, generally for incompetency, mis-
conduct in office, and the conviction of a crime
in a criminal proceeding.
35
3 E.g., State v. Allen, 126 Fla. 878, 172 So. 222
(1937); State v. Foster, 32 Kan. 14, 3 Pac. 534
(1884); In re Byrne, 193 La. 566, 191 So. 729
(1939).
3 McKittrick v. Graves, 346 Mo, 990, 144 S.W.2d
91 (1940); State v. Wallach, 353 Mo. 312, 182
S.W.2d 313 (1944).
1 Wilbur v. Howard, 70 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Ky.
1947).
3- The following have been assigned by statute as
causes for civil action against a public official:
malfeasance, misfeasance, nonfeasance, neglect of
duty in failing to use due diligence in the per-
formance of official duty, inefficiency, incompe-
tency, ineligibility, intemperance, intoxication,
collection of illegal fees, acceptance of free passes,
commission of a felony, favoritism, maladministra-
tion, and, occasionally, misconduct not connected
with office. In proceedings to remove the prose-
cutor's name from the rolls of the court, the court
formulates its own standard as to what constitutes
"unprofessional conduct" to warrant striking of the
prosecutor's name. This remedy merely prevents
the prosecutor from practicing in the particular
court involved, and does not prevent his practicing
in any other court, nor does it affect his holding of
the office of prosecutor. See Wilbur v. Howard, 70
F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Ky. 1947).
The most effective and widely used civil remedies
are personal removal actions and quo warranto
proceedings. There are two main forms of personal
removal proceedings: executive removal, and
judicial removal.
In some states, where there is constitutional
provision for executive removal, the governor has
the sole power to determine whether charges against
an officer are sufficient to warrant removal. State v.
Allen, 126 Fla. 878, 172 So. 222 (1937); People v.
Abeam, 131 App. Div. 30, 115 N.Y.S. 664 (1909);
O'Brien v. Olson, 42 Cal. App.2d 449, 109 P.2d 8
(1941); Hatton v. Joughin, 107 Fla. 850, 145 So.
174 (1933). No question of discretion is involved
where the governor uses the executive suspension
power over the public official. In this respect, ex-
ecutive removal differs widely from quo warranto,
Civil remedies, including removal of police-
men from their jobs through process of the civil
service commission hearing, are more flexible
than criminal prosecutions, in that they need
not be based upon the commission of a crime.
In this respect, they afford a remedy when the
official, particularly the prosecutor, is incom-
petent but not corrupt, or when the requisite
for instance. The executive order must merely
state facts having a reasonable relation to a ground
of suspension from office outlined in statutory pro-
visions. Furthermore, an allegation of fact con-
tained in an executive suspension order need not be
as definite and specific as allegations in an informa-
tion or indictment in a criminal prosecution.
Judicial review in this sphere is limited. A court
cannot review the sufficiency of the evidence used
by the governor as a basis for removal. The deter-
mination of the grounds for removal is a function
solely for the senate and governor under such rules
as may be prescribed. The court, however, can ex-
amine the jurisdictional facts upon which the
governor rests his action. Also, the court may ex-
amine the charges against an official to see that they
conform reasonably to statutory cause, and to en-
force the right of the defendant to a hearing on the
specified charges. On this topic of executive re-
moval, see: State v. Allen, 126 Fla. 878, 172 So. 222
(1937); Donahue v. Will County, 100 Ill. 94 (1881);
State v. Hay, 45 Neb. 321, 63 N.W. 821 (1895);
State v. Purchase, 57 N.D. 511, 222 N.W. 652
(1928).
Since courts have no inherent power of removal of
public officials, Brister v. Weston, 241 Wis. 584,
6 N.W.2d 648 (1942), provision is often made by
constitutions or statutes for judicial removal pro-
ceedings of such officials. State v. Scarth, 151
Okla. 178, 3 P.2d 446 (1931); Is re Bostwick, 43
Ohio App. 76, 181 N.E. 905 (1931). This proceeding
may be brought by a private citizen where it is pro-
vided for by statute. Otherwise, the individual is
required to show a special interest in the action,
such as, an allegation that he is entitled to the same
office. Wishek v. Becker, 10 N.D. 63, 84 N.W. 590
(1900); Woods v. Varnum, 85 Cal. 639, 24 PAC.
843 (1890). Where not otherwise provided for by
statute, it is permissible for the court to authorize
proceedings to be conducted either by the district
attorney or by attorneys appointed by him. State
v. Box, 34 Tex. Civ. App. 435, 78 S.W. 982 (1904).
judicial removal proceedings are designed to pro-
vide a speedy remedy for the removal of corrupt
and unfaithful officials. State v. Scarth, 151 Okla.
[Vol. 48
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proof of corruption is not available. Conse-
quently, such actions have been more frequently
employed against law enforcement officials than
criminal procedures.
The objective, in imposing judicial sanction
against a dishonest law enforcement official, is
not primarily his removal and punishment, but
the incidental effect upon the criminal elements
178, 3 P.2d 446 (1931). Since this form of action is
sometimes considered penal, or quasi-criminal,
courts have discretion to determine whether facts
require removal, and a finding that the officer was
guilty of misconduct in office does not of itself
necessitate removal. State v. Tarr, 62 S.D. 305,
252 N.W. 854 (1934). Generally, however, the
judicial removal proceeding is classified as a civil
remedy. State v. Scarth, swpra. In the absence of
statutory provisions prescribing the procedure,
proceedings are prosecuted according to common law
practice and according to the civil procedure ap-
plicable in the particular jurisdiction. State v.
Scarth, supra. Sometimes, however, it is held that
the ordinary rules of civil procedure do not apply to
a summary proceeding for removal authorized by
statute. Beesley v. State, 219 Ind. 239, 37 N.E.2d
540 (1941). In such cases, the legislature has a
liberal discretion in prescribing the procedures to be
follolved. Fitts v. Superior Court in and for Los
Angeles County, 6 Cal.2d 230, 57 P.2d 510 (1936).
Ordinarily, the rules governing criminal pleading
do not apply in a judicial removal proceeding, and
the rules of pleading used are those applicable to
ordinary civil actions. King v. Smith, 98 Mont. 171,
38 P.2d 274 (1934). The majority rule is that in this
type of removal action, an officer may be removed
for an offense which is punishable criminally, al-
though he has not been convicted on an indictment
for the crime. The official, however, cannot be im-
prisoned excepting upon conviction in a criminal
action. Bland v. State, 38 S.W. 252 (Tex. 1896).
Quo warranto and judicial removal proceedings
are similar in that in order to warrant removal
where the charge is the commission of misconduct
in office, guilt must be established beyond a reason-
able doubt, Phillips v. State, 75 Okla. 46, 181 Pac.
713 (1919), or by evidence that is clear and con-
vincing. In re Diehl, 47 Ohio App. 17, 189 N.E.
855 (1933).
As distinguished from judicial removal, quo
warranto is an action to try title to a public office.
Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449 (1884). Although in
form a criminal proceeding, que warranto is a civil
remedy addressed to preventing a continued ex-
responsible for his dishonesty. A successful
criminal prosecution can serve as an object
lesson to other officials who might be, or might
contemplate being, in the pay of organized
crime. Furthermore, the nature of a criminal
prosecution is such that newspapers and other
mass media seize upon it as good selling ma-
terial, with the result that such a prosecuiton of
a public official may be clothed with opprobrious
publicity, often sensationalized. This is not
present in civil cases and it can 'react to the
distinct disadvantage of organized criminality.
Glaring publicity, revealing and emphasizing
the active presence of criminal activities in the
community, has very apparent power to dis-
courage public patronage of such activities. On
the other hand, the assumption of public office
implies that the officeholder is subject to re-
moval if he fails to live up to the responsibilities
of his office. Such a dismissal from office lacks
the stigma attached to criminal indictment.
Criminal prosecution, therefor, rather than
civil removal, appears to be the more potent
weapon against criminal organizations and cor-
rupt law enforcement officials.
That is not to say, however, that civil action
should be unduly minimized in importance.
There may be instances in which it is impossible
ercise of authority unlawfully asserted. Johnson v.
Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479 (1933). The
remedy, however, is not ordinarily available to
regulate the manner of exercising the powers of the
office. Johnson v. Conservative Savings & Loan
Ass'n, 143 Neb. 805, 11 N.W.2d 89 (1943).
The action of quo warranto is a judicial pro-
ceeding, and the fact that the legislature has
assigned a specific removal process for public
officials does not prevent judicial removal through a
quo warranto proceeding, upon any of the same
statutory causes which would warrant a statutory
removal proceeding. They are not mutually ex-
clusive remedies. State v. Wymore, 345 Mo. 169,
132 S.W.2d 979 (1939). An information in quo
warranto may be instituted by the attorney general
or by the district attorney of an adjoining district,
McKittrick v. Graves, 346 Mo. 990, 144 S.W.2d 91
(1940), or by statute, a civil district judge can
appoint an attorney to institute suit to remove the
official from office on the request of a specified
number of taxpayers. In re Byrne, 193 La. 566, 191
So. 729 (1939).
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to produce sufficient evidence to sustain a
criminal indictment against a known dishonest
official. In criminal proceedings against public
officials, the prosecution is governed by general
rules governing the weight and sufficiency of
evidence in criminal prosecutions.36 Further-
more, the rules as to admissibility of evidence in
criminal prosecutions usually apply in criminal
actions against officialsY Thus, if the law en-
forcement official has neglected his duties, or
performed them improperly, but there is in-
sufficient evidence to support a criminal charge
of nonfeasance, a civil action may at least per-
mit his removal from office.33
Vhere the official is charged with the com-
mission of a crime subjecting him to removal
from office, it is not necessary in a civil action
that he be found guilty of the crime itself.9
However, notwithstanding the civil character of
judicial proceedings for removal, some courts
hold that the rules governing the introduction
of evidence in criminal cases must be followed.40
This rule has been qualified in some jurisdictions
so that an objection to the introduction of any
evidence under the accusation will be allowed
and sustained only where it affects the real
merits of the controversy and the substantial
rights of the defendant.4' There is lack of uni-
formity among the decisions as to the standard
of proof that must be met before the official can
36 State v. Williams, 94 Vt. 423, 111 A. 701
(1920).
7 People v. Deysher, 2 Cal.2d 141, 40 P.2d 259
(1935); Sanders v. Commonwealth, 249 Ky. 225,
60 S.W.2d 586 (1933).
"s It must be kept in mind, however, that the
discretionary nature of the prosecutor's office
plays as significant a part in civil actions as in
criminal. This discretion must be overcome in a
civil proceeding by proof that the acts, or instances
of inaction, were such as to be without the bounds
of a good faith use of discretion. See State v.
Wallach, 353 Mo. 312, 182 S.W.2d 313 (1944), for
an example of the breadth of this discretion as it
affects requirements of proof in civil actions.
20 Law v. Smith, 34 Utah 394, 98 Pac. 300
(1908).
40 Skeen v. Paine, 32 Utah 295, 90 Pac. 440
(1907).
41 State v. Borstad, 27 N.D. 533, 147 N.W. 380
(1914).
be removed from office on the basis of the
alleged crime. Some cases hold, that, irrespec-
tive of whether such removal proceedings are
deemed criminal or civil4 in character, the de-
fendant cannot be removed unless it is estab-
lished by the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt that he committed the crime.4' Other
cases hold that the evidence in support of the
complaint need only be clear and convincing."
In such a proceeding, of course, the officer can
only be removed from office; he cannot be con-
victed of the alleged crime, conviction being
attendant only to a criminal prosecution.
Where the basis of sanction against the official
is the commission of a crime, a criminal indict-
ment is preferable to a removal action, both
because of its punitive quality and incidental
effect on organized crime, and because the
elements of guilt in both criminal and removal
actions may have to be established sub-
stantially to the same degree. In other words, if
the state has sufficient evidence to prove the
commission of the crime for civil removal pur-
poses, it probably has sufficient evidence to
warrant criminal indictment.
Law enforcement officials generally may be
4
2Some cases have held that judicial removal
proceedings are penal, Beesley v. State, 219 Ind.
239, 37 N.E.2d 540 (1941), or quasi-criminal,
State v. Naumann, 213 Ia. 418, 239 N.W. 93
(1931), in character, while others have considered
them civil actions. Sullivan v. District Court of
Second Judicial Dist. in and for Silver Bow County,
196 P.2d 452 (1948); State v. Scarth, 151 Okla.
178, 3 P.2d 446 (1931). It has been held also that
such proceedings, being governed by the special
practice provided by the legislature, are neither
civil nor criminal. State v. Borstad, 27 N.D. 533,
147 N.W. 380 (1914). As distinguished from quo
warranto, a removal proceeding concedes title to
office and proceeds on the theory that the official
either has not forfeited his office by the act for-
bidden or has committed a criminal offense and
subjected himself to punishment and forfeiture of
the office on conviction. McKittrick v. Wymore,
343 Mo. 98, 119 S.W.2d 941 (1939).
4 'Phillips v. State, 75 Okla. 46, 181 Pac. 713
(1919).
"In re Diehl, 47 Ohio App. 17, 189 N.E. 855
(1933); Crowder v. Smith, 232 Ia. 254, 4 N.W.2d
267 (1942).
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indicted for the broad crime of "misconduct in
office" in the performance of duties of the
office.4 5 This crime is of three types: mal-
feasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance. Mal-
feasance is the doing of an act wholly wrong and
unlawful,46 involving moral turpitude.
4 7 Mis-
41 McKittrick v. Williams, 346 Mo. 1003, 144
S.W.2d 98 (1940).
46Holmes v. Osbor, 57 Ariz. 522, 115 P.2d 775
(1941).
'7Ex pare Amos, 93 Fla. 5, 112 So. 289 (1927);
cf. State v. Jefferson, 88 N.J.L. 447, 97 At. 162
(1916); Commonwealth v. Rowe, 12 Ky. 482,
66 S.W. 29 (1902); Speer v. State, 130 Ark. 457,
198 S.W. 113 (1917).
In the Jefferson case, the prosecutor was charged
with accepting bribes from violators of the crim-
inal law and thus giving them immunity from
prosecution for their crimes. The court ruled that
an allegation of bribery was sufficient to sustain a
malfeasance indictment.
The Speer case involved an indictment charging
malfeasance against the prosecutor for abetting crime
by prosecuting operators of gambling houses for
the misdemeanor of gaming, instead of for the felony
as itwas under state law. In defining "corrupt intent"
to satisfy malfeasance requirements, the court said
it did not have to include wrongful self-gain, but
could be shown through evidence of acts committed
with lack of good faith. In resolving the issue of
good faith, the opinion stated that similar acts of
commission or omission occurring about the same
time as the violation alleged, tending to prove the
issue, are admissible. Hence, evidence that other
gambling houses were running during the time of the
breach of the duty alleged, was competent to show
bad faith in the exercise of discretion. In defining
the duty of the prosecutor to initiate proceedings
against parties whom he knows, or has reason to
believe, have committed crimes, the court held that
the mere fact that such duties rise to the dignity of
exercising discretion, cannot excuse neglect of duty
by the prosecutor.
The Speer case is questionable in its application
of malfeasance requirements to the indictment.
Generally, it is not necessary in such a case to allege
corruptness: corrupt intent should be a necessary
allegation only when the intent with which the
particular action was effected results in the moral
turptitude of the act itself. Thus far the Speer
case is on familiar ground. Query, however, whether
acts committed without good faith are therefor
inherently corrupt?
feasance is a default in not doing a lawful act
in a proper manner. 8 Self-gain is often an in-
gredient of the crime of malfeasance, but is not
usually associated with misfeasance. An official
who accepts a bribe would be guilty of mal-
feasance rather than the lesser offense of mis-
feasance. Nonfeasance is the substantial failure
to perform a duty without sufficient excuse.49
At this point, the distinction between the
ministerial duties of the police and the dis-
cretionary ones of the prosecutor, assumes
practical importance. It is generally held that
wilfulness and corruptness are essential elements
of the general crime of misconduct in office.5 0
Where the office is ministerial, however, the
only prerequisite to bringing a criminal action
for misconduct in office is that his breach of
duty be wilful. 5' A showing that a police officer
"8 Holmes v. Osbor, 57 Ariz. 522, 115 P.2d 775
(1941).
41 Hardie v. Coleman, 115 Fla. 119, 155 So. 129
(1934).
50 1 BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW §§460, 468(a)
(9th ed. 1925).
"1 State v. Sweeten, 83 N.J.L. 364, 85 At. 309
(1912); State v. Kearn, 51 N.J.L. 259, 17 At. 114
(1889); Commonwealth v. Hubbs, 137 Pa. Super.
244, 8 A.2d 618 (1939). Occasionally courts have
held that an act or omission in breach of a minis-
terial duty must be either wilful or corrupt. State v.
Williams, 109 Ark. 465, 161 S.W. 159 (1913);
Commonwealth v. Rosser, 102 Pa. Super. 78, 156
Atl. 151 (1930); 1 BIsHOP, CRIMNzAL LAW §§459,
468(a) (9th ed. 1925).
Many of the difficulties that have occurred in
attempts to prosecute police officials for misconduct
in office may be found in the situation that has
existed in Cook County, Illinois. One of the chief
impediments to prosecution is the Illinois judicial
use of the federal exclusionary rule. The corrupt
police official can act in such a manner as to thwart
successful prosecution of a criminal defendant and
at the same time protect his own skin from similar
sanction. Under Illinois statute law, maintaining a
gambling house equipped with gaming devices, is
unlawful. ILL. REv. STAT. §343 (1953); ILL. REV.
STAT. §28 (1955). Police duties in this respect are
ministerial, in that the language of the statute
directs them to take action against violators. The
wide-open conditions that flourish in certain areas
in Cook County cannot exist without local cor-
ruption, i.e., the "pay off" to members of the
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knowingly and intentionally refused to perform
his duty, such as in following orders issued by
a superior, without good excuse, would tend to
prove wilfulness. It is not necessary that illegal
or corrupt motives of the officer be alleged in
police force. Police officials have the power in
Illinois to destroy gaming implements without
violating any constitutional provision. People v.
Moore, 410 Ill. 241, 102 N.E.2d 146 (1951). It is at
this point that corrupt officials have gone through
the semblance of performing their duty by raiding
gambling houses without a search warrant, seizing a
few pieces of equipment, and thus preventing the
use of the equipment in a criminal prosecution
against the offender. They perform their duty when
the raids are instituted; as such, they serve an
harassment quality which is not without value as a
means of discouraging the criminal elements from
continuing their illegal operations. The fact has
been, however, that such raids have accomplished
very little of practical value. Furthermore, the
official is only truly performing his duty when he
diligently attempts to obtain the necessary search
warrant in order to obtain competent evidence for
use against the offender in a criminal trial. Harass-
ment raids are of supplemental utility only, if the
responsible law enforcement officer is doing his job.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to get a case against
such an official, since he can reply that whenever he
applies for a search warrant, the particular gambling
house is "tipped off" in advance, thus frustrating
the purpose of the warrant. This type of defense
has assumed a certain nuisance value in criminal
prosecutions of police officials in Cook county.
The Kefauver committee uncovered several
Illinois cases where a jury acquitted a corrupt
official despite the strongest competent evidence
against him. See note 90 infra.
Another practical difficulty, has been the peculiar
antipathy occasionally displayed by Illinois courts
toward the efforts of the law to root out organized
crime. As an example, in a recent Cook county case,
the court sustained a motion to suppress illegally
seized evidence by a defendant who lacked any
proprietary interest in the goods introduced or the
premises from which they were taken. State v.
Torrello, (unreported). Such a holding, in clear
violation of any basic requirement of the exclusion-
ary rule, compels the thought that if it happened
once, it could happen again. That is, it is conceivable
that a judge in a case against a public official, in
which illegally seized evidence is sought to be in-
troduced against the official, and in which he has no
interest, will sustain a motion to suppress made by
order to find him guilty of the crime of mis-
conduct in office.
Where the duty violated involves discretion,
however, it is usually held that "corrupt intent"
is a vital element of the offense. This require-
ment is designed to protect the discretionary
official from indictment for mere error of judg-
ment or for mistake of law. 2 Corrupt intent
signifies the doing of an act with the intent to
obtain an improper advantage inconsistent with
official duty and the rights of others.n Corrupt
intent may be actual, as in the case of the
crimes of bribery, embezzlement, and receiving
benefits from the deposit of public funds; 4 or it
may be implied from an habitual failure to
perform the duties of the office. 55
While "corrupt intent" is generally all that
is required in an indictment charging non-
feasance and misfeasance, confusion has re-
sulted from application of the terms "corrupt"
and "willful." For instance, several cases have
held that if the duty involves discretion, the
wrongful act or omission must be both wilful and
corrupt to constitute nonfeasance or mis-
feasance. 6 Another case held that an allegation
the official, despite the requirements of the ex-
clusionary rule.
One of the intrinsic problems in getting evidence
admitted into Illinois criminal proceedings, has been
the fact that much of it is derived from informers.
Due to the undercover nature of the illicit dealings
between organized crime and enforcement officials,
informers have been employed by responsible legal
officers and investigative agencies such as the
Chicago Crime Commission. It is not possible to
sustain a criminal indictment on this type of
evidence alone, since such evidence is inadmissible
to prove the guilt of the person accused. It is a not
uncommon occurrence that the corruption of a
particular official will be known, yet nothing ap-
parently can be done about it.
- State v. Wheatley, 192 Md. 44, 63 A.2d 644
(1949).
5 State v. Lehman, 182 Mo. 424, 81 S.W. 1118
(1904).
5State v. Douglass, 239 Mo. 674, 144 S.W. 407
(1912).
5 Cf. State v. Green, 52 S.C. 520, 30 S.E. 683
(1898).
56 State v. Wheatley, 192 Md. 44, 63 A.2d 644-46
(1949); Commonwealth v. Brownmiller, 141 Pa.
Super. 107, 14 A.2d 907 (1940); Commonwealth v.
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of either wilfulness or corrupt intent is sufficient
to sustain an indictment for violation of a dis-
cretionary duty.0 Even where statutes have
been enacted requiring only a wilful refusal or
neglect in order to convict, cases sometimes
have construed these statutes as requiring an
allegation of corrupt intent in the case of an
alleged violation of a discretionary duty. 0
One of the reasons for the rather indiscrimi-
nate use of "corrupt" and "wilful" is the fact
that courts sometimes have blurred the precise
meaning of "corrupt intent."6 0 A few courts, for
instance, have held that "wilful" is synonomous
with "corrupt intent."60 Another view is that
an allegation of wilfulness is sufficient, even
though the duty involved is discretionary, and
that corruptness need not be alleged. 61
Hubbs, 137 Pa. Super. 244, 8 A.2d 618 (1939); 1
BISHoP, ClmunAL LAw §460; 1 BURDIcK, LAw
or CirmE §272(a); MiLLER, CRnMnAL LAW
§162(a).
5 F- porle Amos, 93 Fla. 5, 112 So. 289 (1927).
5 6E.g., State v. Battrud, 210 Minn. 214, 297
N.W. 713 (1941).
59 State v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152, 96 A.2d 63
(1953); Commonwealth v. Hubbs, 137 Pa. Super.
244, 8 A.2d 618 (1939); Steinman v. McWilliams,
6 Pa. 170, 178 (1847).
60 State v. Sweeten, 83 N.J.L. 364, 85 Atl. 309
(1912); State v. Castle, 75 N.J.L. 187, 66 At. 1059
(1907); State v. Kearn, 51 N.J.L. 259, 265, 17 Atl.
114, 116 (1889).
6L State v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152, 96 A.2d 63
(1953).
In this case, the court held that "wilfulness" in-
dicates a lack of good faith, and in the absence of
just cause or excuse, equivalent to bad faith. The
court further held that these elements sufficiently
constituted the mental elements of the crime.
For a case apparently supporting this view, see
State v. Jefferson, 88 N.J.L. 447, 97 At. 162 (1916).
In that case, the court indicated that a charge of
corruptness is surplusage, being implicitly alleged
by "wilfulness." The Jefferson case, however, can
only be regarded as doubtful authority for the
principle that wilfulness constitutes a substitute for
corruptness, since there the crime alleged inherently
involved moral turpitude (accepting a bribe), and
no allegation of corruptness was required. The case
of Commonwealth v. Hubbs, 137 Pa. Super. 244,
250, 8 A.2d 618 (1939), on the other hand, held that
only an exercise of discretion in bad faith could be
indictable. Furthermore, only when "wilfully"
The requirement of allegation and proof of
"corrupt intent" in most misfeasance and non-
feasance actions increases the chances of failure
to obtain a successful prosecution. Partly for
this reason, civil removal actions have been
more frequently used than criminal prosecu-
tions. There has been general insistence by the
courts, however, that corruptness or some al-
legation to like effect, be required in order to
protect the discretionary offi6er from being put
in fear of prosecution for bona fide errors of
judgment.6 2 This reasoning is founded upon the
supposition that a certain quantum of discretion
is needed in the office of such an official as the
public prosecutor. If the prosecutor were re-
quired arbitrarily to investigate and initiate
prosecution in every instance of violation of the
law, difficult cases involving serious crimes
might be poorly handled because of time con-
sumed by minor ones.
Care should be taken not to misuse the term
"wilful" in nonfeasance and misfeasance cases.
The refusal of the prosecutor to investigate and
prosecute several out of many cases confronting
him would be clearly wilful in the sense of being
intentional;3 however, it cannot be inferred,
without more, that such refusal was motivated
by a corrupt intent, a connotation which has
been suggested to be included in the meaning
of "wilful."6 To subscribe to the reasoning that
appears in criminal statutes has it been construed
to include improper motive within its meaning.
Roberts v. United States, 126 Fed. 894, 904 (5th
Cir. 1903). See also Commonwealth v. Hubbs,
supra. But see 1 BISHOP, CRmnNAL LAW §428.
For cases on the question of whether "corrupt
intent" necessarily includes wrongful self gain or if it
is sufficient that the alleged acts were committed
with a lack of good faith, see Speer v. State, 130
Ark. 457, 198 S.W. 113 (1917); State v. Sweeten,
83 N.J.L. 364, 85 Atl. 309 (1912); cf. Broadbent v.
United States, 149 F.2d 580, 581 (10th Cir. 1945).
60Public officers should not be hampered in the
performance of discretionary duties by fear of
criminal prosecution for an error of judgment
committed in good faith. Hence, it is necessary that
in the prosecution of a discretionary official,
"corrupt intent" be alleged. Commonwealth v.
Hubbs, 137 Pa. Super. 244, 8 A.2d 618 (1939).
6 See Baker, The Prosecutor, 23 J. Cam. L.
CRimmoLoGy, 771 (1933).
61 See notes 60 and 61 supra.
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"intentional" is synonomous with "wilful", and
that the latter is synonomous with "corrupt
intent", would be in effect to destroy the dis-
cretionary nature of the prosecutor's functions,
with the result that a prosecutor might fail to
exercise his discretion for fear of prosecution
for an honest error in judgment, and proceed
with an investigation or prosecution which he
considers unwarranted. It would be an expense
to the state and to society, and reduce the
efficiency of the prosecutor's office. 65 Wilfulness,
therefore, should not be used as an alternative
allegation to corrupt intent in nonfeasance and
misfeasance actions; it is not synonomous with
the latter and its use generally should be re-
stricted to cases involving alleged breach of a
ministerial duty.
An exception to the general rule of alleging
"corrupt intent" in criminal indictments is to
be found in malfeasance prosecutions. Since
malfeasance is an act involving moral turpi-
tude, it is the perpetration of the act itself,
apart from the motive for the act, which sub-
jects the official to punishment. Since the act of
malfeasance inherently involves corruptness or
self gain, it has been held that corrupt intent
need not be alleged in order to charge this
crime.66 Neither does malfeasance in office re-
quire proof of corruption, selfish motives or
hope of private gain. The indictment, how-
ever, must contain an allegation of the commis-
sion of the act, and the proof must sustain this
charge."
- Baker, The Prosecutor, 23 J. Clm. L. &
CRIMNOLOGY, 770 (1933).
66EX pare Amos, 93 Fla. 5, 23, 112 So. 289, 296
(1927); cf. State v. Jefferson, 88 N.J.L. 447, 97
Atl. 162 (1916); Commonwealth v. Rowe, 12 Ky.
482, 66 S.W. 29 (1902); Speer v. State, 130 Ark.
457, 198 S.W. 113 (1917).
67 Dinneen v. Larson, 231 Wis. 207, 286 N.W.
41 (1939).
68 In order to sustain an indictment charging
bribery in Illinois, for example, the state must
prove that the defendant was a public officer, that
he was offered and accepted money or other valu-
able thing, and that such payments were for the
purpose of influencing him in the performance of his
official duties. People v. Siciliano, 4 Ill.2d 581,
123 N.E.2d 725 (1954). In the same state, to
sustain an indictment against a public official
It has been advocated that there should be no
criminal proceedings against prosecutors for
misfeasance or nonfeasance. 69 This view is based
upon the hypothesis that the threat of criminal
prosecution, regardless of the elements neces-
sary to be proved for a conviction, will detract
from the discretionary nature of the prosecutor's
duties. Adherents of this view argue that the
threat of civil removal is a sufficient sanction,
and yet affords protection from criminal prose-
cution to honest but incompetent prosecutors.
There is, however, the contrary view that, in
spite of the dangers involved and the difficulty
in ascertaining corrupt intent, the benefits to be
gained from controlling law enforcement officials
through criminal process are too valuable to
society to be jeopardized.70 This latter view is
the more realistic. The danger to the honest
prosecutor or other official whose duties are
discretionary, is more apparent than real. There
is a wide gap between even a series of blunders
of judgment and their commission in bad faith,
or with corrupt intent; and the courts fairly con-
sistently require that this gap be convincingly
bridged before allowing a conviction of the
official. 71 Even conceding the existence of cer-
tain dangers to a wise use of discretion from the
threat of criminal prosecution, they are out-
weighed by the possibility that such an official
may be more susceptible to criminal influence
than he otherwise would be if he knows that the
worst eventuality is civil removal from office.
alleging failure to enforce the laws, nonfeasance, it
must be shown that he knew such places existed,
where they were located, and that he failed to act
upon this information. People v. Flynn, 375 Ill.
366, 31 N.E.2d 591 (1941).
69 Baker, The Prosecutor, 23 J. CRim. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY, 770 (1933); Snyder, The District
Attorney's Hardest Task, 30 J. Cans. L. & CRIMI-
NOLoGoY, 167 (1939).
70 E.g., State v. Allen, 126 Fla. 878, 172 So. 222
(1937); Attorney General v. Tufts, 239 Mass.
458, 132 N.E. 322 (1921); State v. Wallach, 353
Mo. 312, 182 S.W.2d 313 (1944); McKittrick v.
Graves, 346 Mo. 990, 144 S.W.2d 91 (1940);
McKittrick v. Wymore, 345 Mo. 169, 132 S.W.2d
979 (1939).
7 See Wilbur v. Howard, 70 F. Supp. 930 (E.D.
Ky. 1947); McKittrick v. Graves, 346 Mo. 990,
144 S.W.2d 91 (1940); McKittrick v. Wymore, 345
Mo. 169, 132 S.W.2d 979 (1939).
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SPECIAL EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS
It is frequently difficult to establish the
official's knowledge of illegal activities which he
is under a duty to suppress. Where a public
official is charged with failure to enforce gam-
bling and liquor laws, evidence of gambling
stamps outstanding in the community should be
competent evidence against him. In one case,
the number of persons who had paid federal
occupational tax on slot machines was held
admissible as evidence of the bad faith of the
prosecutor in repeatedly failing to initiate prose-
cution.72- The court stressed the fact that the
names of the purchasers of these stamps were
listed in a public record, with which the prose-
cutor should have been familiar. While this
case involved merely a proceeding to remove the
prosecutor's name from the rolls of the court, a
civil action, there is no infirmity in the nature
of such evidence to prevent its utilization in
criminal proceedings.
Where a prosecutor has entered many nolle
prosequis, and it is shown that there was ample
evidence to warrant further prosecution, his
actions in this respect may be used as a basis for
determining the bad faith of the prosecutor in
the performance of his duties.3 In addition,
pleas of guilty by individuals named in grand
jury indictments returned against them consti-
tute admissions against interest, and as such are
competent evidence in a removal proceeding to
prove that the official knew, or should have
known, of lawviolations within his jurisdiction.4
Evidence illegally seized from a third party
should be admissible in an action against the
official where it is pertinent to show neglect of
duty or wrongful performance. In federal courts,
and in those states which have adopted the
federal exclusionary rule, evidence illegally
seized from a defendant is not admissible in a
criminal proceeding against him. It has also
been held that if the defendant can show merely
a proprietary interest either in the goods seized
without a warrant or in the premises from which
they were seized, he has standing to object to
7 Wilbur v. Howard, 70 F. Supp. 930 (E.D.
Ky. 1947).
7 McKittrick v. Graves, 346 Mo. 990, 144 S.W.2d
91(1940).
74 Id, at 96.
their admissibility against himJ7 But since a
law enforcement official usually does not have
any proprietary interest in the illegally seized
evidence, it should be considered usable against
him.76
RoLE OF rnr. GRA,,D JuRY
A potent weapon in fixing responsibility for
corruption in law enforcement is the use of the
common law investigative powers of the grand
jury. The grand jury has the duty to make in-
vestigations whenever the arm of the govern-
ment charged with the duty of conducting
criminal prosecutions presents evidence to it
under the reasonable belief that the criminal
laws have been violated.:7 Where the public
prosecutor himself is corrupt, the court, when it
becomes apparent that a system of crime exists
among public officers, can properly order an
investigation by the grand jury; however, the
investigation initially cannot be directed at a
particular individual, nor at the commission of
ordinary crimes.78 Once the grand jury is con-
vened, however, its power is not dependent
upon the court, but is original and complete,
and it has the power to inquire into all offenses
which come to its knowledge, whether from the
court, the prosecuting attorney, its own mem-
bers, or from any other source. It may make
"United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
78 The JYffers case, note 75 supra, by holding that
an allegation of proprietary interest in either the
goods or the premises gives the defendant standing
to suppress, is at variance with the prior exclusion-
ary rule requirements that the defendant must
allege a property interest in the goods and the
premises in order to have such standing. United
States v. Jeffers is not binding upon state courts,
of course, and many states require still that the
defendant meet the dual-requirement test.
17 In re Black, 47 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1931).
The inquisitorial power of the grand jury is the
most valuable function which it possesses today and,
far more than supposed protection which it gives to
the accused, justifies its survival as an institution.
As an engine of discovery against organized and
far-reaching crime, it has no counterpart. Policy
emphatically forbids that there should be any
curtailment of it except in the dearest cases. In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283 (1933).
78 Ferrill v. Graydon, 333 Ill. 429, 164 N.E. 832
(1929).
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presentments of its own knowledge, without any
instruction or authority from the court
5
The grand jury has the power to proceed with
an investigation and to subpoena witnesses,
without being required to state in the subpoena
the subject matter of the investigation or name
the person or persons against.whom the inquiry
is directed. 80 This is a useful power where an
official is under suspicion of misconduct, but
there is not enough evidence to warrant an out-
right criminal prosecution. The grand jury has
the authority to seek this evidence through its
broad investigative powers, once it has been
properly convened. Furthermore, where an
inquiry is desired as to matters of general con-
cern, and no particular person is charged with
an offense, the grand jury and not the court, is
the only proper body to make such investi-
gation.81
In some states, statutes have been enacted
giving the grand jury authority to call witnesses
to discover whether or not a crime has been
committed.8' Even where special statutes have
set up special investigating bodies for particular
offenses, they have been construed as not limit-
ing the power of the grand jury to make in-
vestigations as to such offenses, or to divest it
of such power.83
In at least one state, the grand jury has the
power to inquire into the commission of all
offenses, whether they are felonies or mis-
79 People v. Sheridan, 349 Ill. 202, 181 N.E. 617
(1932).80 United States v. Invader Oil Corp., 5 F.2d
715 (1925); In re National Window Glass Workers,
287 F. 219 (D.C. 1922).
81 McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 187 Atl. 498
(1936).
2 Ploscowe, ORGANIZED CRI, 230 (1952).
83 Hinz v. Hunt, 96 Okla. 285, 221 Pac. 1022
(1924). A statute prescribing additional causes for
the removal of a person from public office, actions
thereunder to be commenced in name of state on the
relation of the attorney general, held did not de-
prive the grand jury of jurisdiction granted in a
prior act to inquire into and prefer charges against
any public officer not subject to impeachment,
within the prescribed causes for removal mentioned
in the statute.
demeanors, and whether or not there has been a
preliminary hearing before a magistrate.84
There are limitations to the jurisdiction of
the grand jury, however. The majority rule
seems t6 be that a grand jury investigation
must not become a "fishing expedition", or a
blanket inquiry for purely speculative purposes.
It has been held in some cases that there is no
power in the grand jury to institute or prosecute
an inquiry on the chance or possibility that some
crime may be discovered.85 On the other hand,
many courts have ruled that the scope of the
grand jury's inquiry is not narrowly limited by
forecasts of the probable result of the investi-
gation.8 6
The grand jury has served, incidentally, as a
method of control over police officers called to
testify before it. There is authority for allowing
the dismissal of policemen who refuse to sign
"immunity waivers" in advance of testifying
before the grand jury.8Y The theory is that a
84 Reis v. Warden, 239 App. Div. 891, 264 N.Y.S.
948 (1933).
85 McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 187 Atl. 498
(1936). In states like Pennsylvania, which limit the
grand jury to something more than a fishing ex-
pedition, if an investigation by a grand jury is
directed by a court, it involves all the powers and
incidents necessary to a complete inquiry into the
subject matter involved, and that the jury, through
the court, may subpoena books, papers, and wit-
nesses, and subject them to investigation. See Fraley
v. Rotan, 82 Pa. Super. 172 (1923).
16 People v. Doe, 247 App. Div. 324, 286 N.Y.S.
343 (1936); O'Connell v. United States, 40 F.2d
201 (1930, cert. denied, 51 Sup. Ct. 658; Carroll v.
United States, 16 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1927), cerl.
denied, 273 U.S. 763. In the Carroll case, the court
discussed the scope of the grand jury's power of in-
vestigation:
The grand jury investigation does not necessarily
cease after it has heard the witnesses brought be-
fore it by the.., attorney. Its investigation and
full dtuy is not performed unless and until every
clue has been run down and all witnesses searched
for and examined in every proper way to find if a
crime has been committed, and to charge the proper
person with the commission thereof. 16 F.2d at
592.
8 Drury v. Hurley, 339 Ill. App. 33 (1949);
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police officer, by reason of his special status, his
duties and responsibilities, may not invoke his
constitutional privilege against self-incrimina-
tion in matters touching upon his occupation
without being guilty of a breach of his official
duty." However, since his dismissal is in the
nature of a civil service discharge 9 it is not a
criminal punishment, and from that standpoint
is less desirable than an outright criminal in-
dictment against a corrupt officer. It is an
effective means of removal, however, and there
is always the possibility that an officer would
rather "talk" than lose his job. The coercive
effect, therefore, of such a measure should not
Christal v. Police Commission of San Francisco,
33 Cal. App.2d 564, 92 P.2d 416 (1939).
88 The Drury case court held that a refusal to
testify and a refusal to sign an immunity waiver
before testifying are actually similar in effect.
Such officers are guardians of the peace and
security of the community, and the efficiency of our
whole system, designed for the purpose of main-
taining law and order, depends upon the extent to
which such officers perform their duties and are
faithful to the trust reposed in them.... It is for
the performance of these duties that police officers
are commissioned and paid by the community, and
it is a violation of said duties for any police officer to
refuse to disclose pertinent facts within his knowl-
edge even though such disclosure may show, or
tend to show, that he himself has engaged in
criminal activities. Christal v. Police Commission
of San Francisco, 33 Cal. App.2d 564, 92 P.2d 416
(1939).
89 In the Drury case, defendants filed for writ of
certiorari to review action of civil service commission
which had ordered them discharged from the
police force because of their refusal to execute in
writing immunity waivers when summoned and
prior to testifying before the grand jury concern-
ing matters arising out of their investigation of a
murder case. It was held that the commission's
action was valid, on the grounds that failure to sign
immunity waivers constituted "conduct unbecom-
ing an officer" and was "cause" for removal of
officers from their positions under provisions of
Illinois Civil Service Act, providing that a municipal
civil service employee may not be removed "ex-
cept for cause, upon written charges and after an
opportunity to be heard in his own defense."
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24Y2, §51 (1947).
be overlooked. Furthermore, if enough indi-
viduals can be removed from the law enforce-
ment scene by this method, it may be of con-
siderable value as a lever of control.
CONCLUSION
The responsibility for the existence of cor-
ruption within the ranks of those officials
charged with the duty to execute and enforce
the law is not limited merely to the policeman
and the prosecutor. Some of the blame must be
shared by juries which occasionally, in the face
of the strongest possible case against a corrupt
official, nevertheless manage to deliver a verdict
of acquittal." In addition, the judiciary may be
subject to some criticism for not making more
frequent use of the grand jury as a means for
uncovering corruption in official circles.9'
90 The Kefauver committee considered the
following cases bad examples of jury action. When
the chief of police of Calumet City, Illinois, was
indicted for malfeasance in office, he admitted to
the jury that gambling was widespread in the city.
He defended his action on the basis that license fees
from illegal taverns were supporting the town and
were keeping the tax rate low. Largely on the
support of such a defense, the chief of police was
acquitted by the jury of all charges. The chief of
police of Melrose Park, Illinois, was indicted for
nonfeasance for his repeated failure to take any
action after notification received from the State's
attorney's office, to the effect that certain named
illegal houses were operating within his jurisdic-
tion. The defendant was acquitted. Senate Special
Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in
Interstate Commerce, Third Interim Report, S.
REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 60-1 (1951).
The records of the chiefs of police in these towns,
where gambling joints could be identified merely
by walking down the street, are records of neglect of
official duty and shocking indifference to violations
of law. Equally shocking is the acquiescence of the
people of the towns, as evidenced by the acquittal
of these men and their continuation in office. ibid,
at 61.
1, An outstanding example of what this jury can
accomplish is furnished by the activities of the
"Blue ribbon" grand jury of 1943, which sat in
Cook county, Illinois. As a result of its efforts,
eleven officers of the local highway police, including
the former chief of that organization, were indicted
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